Value Pluralism and Consistency Maximisation in the Writings of Aldo Leopold: Moving Beyond Callicott's Interpretations of the Land Ethic by Dixon, Ben
		
	 1	
Value Pluralism and Consistency Maximization in the Writings of Aldo 
Leopold: Moving Beyond Callicott’s Interpretations of the Land Ethic 
(Forthcoming in Environmental Values) 
BEN DIXON 
Stephen F. Austin State University 
P.O. Box 6082, SFA Station 
Nacogdoches, TX 75962-6082, USA 
Email: bendixon04@gmail.com 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The 70th anniversary of Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac (1949) approaches.     
For philosophers—environmental ethicists in particular—this text has been highly 
influential, especially the ‘Land Ethic’ essay contained therein.  Given philosophers’ 
acumen for identifying and critiquing arguments, one might reasonably think a firm grasp 
of Leopold’s ideas to have emerged from such attention.  I argue that this is not the case.  
Specifically, Leopold’s main interpreter and systematiser, philosopher J. Baird Callicott, 
has shoehorned Aldo Leopold’s ideas into differing monistic moral theories that ill-serve 
a proper understanding.  Against Callicott, my paper argues that Aldo Leopold embraces 
a robust moral pluralism, one that goes beyond mere pragmatics, and he does so while 
seeking a consistency maximisation of values.  A new, improved understanding of 
Leopold’s ideas thus emerges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Aldo Leopold’s ‘Land Ethic’ essay, he claims that no significant change in 
ethics has ever been made without persons internally altering their ‘intellectual emphasis, 
loyalties, affections, and convictions.’  He further points out that ethically broadening the 
notion of community to include nonhuman nature was not something the conservation 
movement of his day was emphasising.  This is evidenced, Leopold surmises, by the 
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absence of conservation-talk in both philosophy and religion circles.1  Much of his A 
Sand County Almanac, the work in which ‘The Land Ethic’ essay is found, seeks to 
persuade the conservationist, the philosopher, and the religionist that a more expansive 
notion of community is warranted.  Intriguingly, Leopold appeals to multiple norms of 
which he assumes his readers are already familiar and presumably theretofore 
sympathetic.  Additionally, Leopold likens the moral changes he advocates to the practice 
of conservation itself.  Doing so implies that just as with sacrificial conservation 
practices, moral conflict that includes a land ethic will surely arise, and its resolution is 
neither neat nor easy.  When these elements are kept in mind and interpreted correctly, a 
very different understanding of Leopold’s ethics emerges than is typically proffered. 
This essay argues that Leopold intellectually commits himself to value pluralism 
and to a consistency maximisation of values, entailing that both these elements need to be 
present within any understanding of a land ethic properly deemed Leopoldian.  Such an 
understanding of Leopold’s ethics stands in strong contrast to two of the most famous 
interpretations put forward by J. Baird Callicott.  The paper unfolds by first explaining 
Callicott’s two differing takes on Leopold, showing some of the severe difficulties 
attending them, difficulties that directly stem from not taking into account the rather 
radical pluralism and consistency maximisation strategies for which I will argue.  This, in 
turn, allows for putting forward the beginnings of an original and more accurate account 
of Leopold, one centering on both pluralism and ethical decision procedures 
incorporating such pluralism. 
Moreover, as will be seen, Leopold’s reasons for doing so hearken to more than 
just a pragmatic pluralism, which has been a point of contention between another 																																																								
  1 Leopold 1949, p. 210. 
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environmental philosopher, Bryan Norton, an advocate of Leopold embracing such 
pragmatism, and Callicott, who sees Leopold eschewing pragmatism.2  My arguments 
imply that Leopold’s investment in pluralism goes much deeper than their debate allows.  
This depth of commitment by Leopold reveals itself pretty much through a 
straightforward reading of Leopold’s ideas in light of a basic understanding of moral 
theory.  However, Callicott’s more entangled interpretations, the latter of which is still 
operative in his moral thinking—as evidenced by his latest book, Thinking Like a Planet: 
The Land Ethic and the Earth Ethic (2013)—very much set the terms for how Leopold’s 
ideas would largely be received and how they are still understood today.  It is to these 
seminal interpretations and to some conceptual disentangling that the paper now turns. 
CALLICOTT’S PRIORITISATIONS OF THE LAND ETHIC  
One ought not underestimate J. Baird Callicott’s continuing scholarly importance.  
His ideas are still a keystone for how many interpret Leopold.  For example, Roberta L. 
Millstein, in her own recent reexamination of Callicott’s later take on Leopold, 
challenges Callicott’s contention that Darwin’s The Descent of Man had supreme 
influence over Leopold’s ethical thinking.  Though she argues Callicott’s reading to be 
flawed, she admits it is now ‘the canonical interpretation’, influencing how many other 
philosophers come to understand Leopold’s ideas.3  Attesting to Callicott’s even broader 
historical influence on environmental philosophy, Wayne Ouderkirk writes the following:  
J. Baird Callicott has been, and continues to be, one of the central figures 
in the development of environmental philosophy.  To say that he has 
helped set the terms of the discussion, that he has developed one of the 																																																								
2 For a sampling of this debate, see Callicott, Grove-Fanning, Rowland, Baskind, French and Walker, 2009. 
Also Norton 2011. 
  3 Millstein 2015, p. 1. 
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central theoretical models in the field, the land ethic, and that his work has 
provoked reactions and reflections that have both clarified other models 
and opened new avenues for continued work is no exaggeration.  [. . .] one 
cannot discuss [environmental ethics] without considering Callicott’s 
views.  And the reverse is also true: If one wants to examine Callicott’s 
views, there is no escaping a discussion of the larger field.  He is that 
important a figure.4  
Echoes of the above characterisation are found in Melissa Clarke’s review of 
Callicott’s latest book, wherein she identifies him continuing to be a ‘renowned leader’ 
within environmental ethics, further assessing Callicott’s recent tome, which includes the 
later interpretation of Leopold that I will criticise here, as making an ‘invaluable 
contribution’ to the field.  Alan Holland’s review of the same book heaps almost identical 
praise regarding Callicott’s continuing relevance and influence.5 
Callicott’s Early Interpretation of Leopold 
One of Callicott’s earliest efforts at explaining Leopold’s ideas is found in his 
controversial essay, ‘Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair’.6  Gary Varner once 
claimed that, excluding Leopold’s own essay, ‘The Land Ethic’, it is likely that no other 
environmental ethics piece is as widely reprinted as Callicott’s ‘A Triangular Affair’.7  
Callicott begins his ‘A Triangular Affair’ essay by proposing that Leopold’s land ethic is 
paradigmatic for what an environmental ethic amounts to,8 citing especially Leopold’s 																																																								
  4 Wayne Ouderkirk, ‘Introduction’, in Land, Value, Community, 2002 p. 1. 
  5 Melissa Clarke 2014, p. 368.  Alan Holland is similarly praiseworthy.  Calling Callicott an 
‘unmistakable and invaluable voice’, Holland explains that Callicott’s new book reaffirms this 
characterisation.  See Holland, 2016. 
  6 Callicott 1995, pp. 237-254. 
  7 Gary Varner 2003, p. 196.   
  8 Callicott 1995, p. 237. 
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efforts to extend ‘direct moral considerability from people to nonhuman natural entities’ 
(i.e., Leopold urges that non-human nature is not simply a bundle of resources to be used 
instrumentally).9  Callicott implies that, ultimately, a land ethic identifies the locus of 
supreme moral value as residing within biotic wholes (i.e., ecosystems), not within any 
individual type of organism, human or otherwise.10 
Callicott explains that such an interpretation of Leopold’s land ethic can 
differentiate environmental ethics from animal rights/animal liberation movements, the 
latter of which Callicott labels ‘humane moralism’.  Hence, the seemingly related 
intellectual trend of assigning intrinsic value to animals is actually, Callicott thinks, part 
of a moral world view that is as distinct from an environmental ethic as humane moralism 
is from an anthropocentric ethic.  Just as anthropocentric ethics underwrite the moral 
permissibility of sacrificing non-human animals to the desires and interests of humans 
(thus separating anthropocentric ethics from the animal-respecting upshot of humane 
moralism), so too does the holism characteristic of an environmental ethic buttress the 
notion that the needs of animals may be sacrificed for the good of, say, ecosystems (thus 
separating humane moralism from an environmental ethic).11  Callicott’s emphasis on the 
schism between humane moralists and environmental ethicists is but one of his 
controversial claims; indeed, it is an aspect whose efficacy, as Louis Pojman pointed out, 
‘played an important historic role in separating animal rights from environmentalism.’12 
Callicott’s trichotomising of environmental ethics, humane moralism, and 
anthropocentric ethics, was motivated—again—by a particular interpretation of Leopold.  
																																																								
  9 Ibid., p. 238. 
  10 Ibid., p. 249. 
  11 Ibid., pp. 238-239. 
  12 Pojman 2001, p. 51. 
		
	 6	
And, at the outset, it is from Callicott’s early interpretation of Leopold that I wish to 
begin distinguishing my own efforts at understanding Leopold. 
To get at the specifics of Callicott’s earliest take on Leopold, it is valuable first to 
take note of Callicott’s idea that what separates Leopold’s land ethic from both 
anthropocentric ethics and humane moralism is embracing exclusively a holistic 
worldview, a perspective nurtured and made reasonable, Callicott expains, by the science 
of ecology.  Remarking on how ecology provides this new perspective, he writes that 
‘ecology focuses upon the relationships between and among things [. . .],’ and prior to 
ecology’s emergence as a science, ‘the landscape appeared to be [. . . ] a collection of 
objects, some of them alive, some conscious, but all the same, an aggregate, a plurality of 
separate individuals.’13 
Callicott thinks it understandable that the earlier atomistic perspective yielded the 
notion that morality involves adjudicating between the rights and interests of individuals.  
Yet, ecology’s ability to unify these atoms into a much larger whole, analogous to the 
second-order wholes wrought, for example, by cells making-up plant and animal bodies, 
changes things, morally, as a ‘third-order whole’ is made intelligible.  Callicott explains 
that Leopold himself sometimes characterised this emerged third-order entity as an 
organic being.  Other times, as Callicott clarifies, Leopold identifies this emerged entity 
as a community.  That is, Leopold thinks that something very much like a community 
also arises given the economic dependencies between various organisms making-up a 
biotic whole, such dependencies yielding unique characteristics attributable only to an 
emerged system, a community of sorts.14 																																																								
  13 Callicott, 1995, p. 241. 
  14 Ibid., pp. 241-242. 
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Leopold’s land ethic and its attempt to extend moral consideration to the land, 
where the land is conceived of as either an organism or a community, become reasonable, 
Callicott further explains, by piggybacking on a number of already privileged ideas, 
including the notion that amongst the variety of human moral duties is self preservation, 
or what he thinks is the same thing, preserving one’s own ‘organic integrity’.  Callicott 
continues this line of thinking about preserving organic integrities, writing: 
It is not uncommon in historical moral theory, further, to find that in 
addition to those peculiar responsibilities we have in relation both to 
ourselves and other persons severally, we also have a duty to behave in 
ways that do not harm the fabric of society per se.  The land ethic, in 
similar fashion, calls our attention to the recently discovered integrity—in 
other words, the unity—of the biota and posits duties binding upon moral 
agents in relation to that whole.  Whatever the strictly formal logical 
connections between the concept of a social community and moral 
responsibility, there appears to be a strong psychological bond between 
that idea and conscience.15 
Callicott thus concludes that Leopold’s representation of the land as either a 
community or as a super-organism is adequate to stir feelings of conscience, the likes of 
which humans already experience toward persons or communities, or in Callicott’s 
words, ‘in relation to delicately complex, functioning social and organic systems.’16   
It is the supposed supremacy of the moral value that humans can perceive within 
biotic wholes that really distinguishes Callicott’s earliest interpretation of Leopold’s land 																																																								
  15 Ibid., p. 242. 
  16 Ibid. 
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ethic.  Callicott even draws from the history of philosophy to demonstrate that 
highlighting a whole’s moral supremacy is not novel.  In so doing, Callicott turns to none 
other than Plato and his idea that, ‘body, soul, and society have similar structures and 
corresponding virtues.  The goodness of each is a function of its structure or organization 
and the relative value of its parts or contribution made to the integrity, stability, and 
beauty of each whole.’  So, just as Plato—in the interest of those wholes denoted by 
body, soul, or community—thinks it appropriate to sometimes sacrifice their constituent 
parts in order to preserve the various virtues of these wholes, similarly, Callicott 
maintains that the holism of the land ethic may require sacrificing, for example, the 
desires, interests, and, yes, even the lives of some humans and other animals to preserve 
the virtues of the biotic community—namely, its integrity, stability, and beauty.17 
Criticisms of Callicott’s Early Interpretation of Leopold 
Callicott’s early interpretation of Leopold, which supremely privileges biotic 
wholes, is the kind of monolithic idea sure to provoke strong reaction.  Indeed, his 
invocation of Plato’s idea that, at times, the good of the whole requires shepherding, 
disciplining, or flat-out eliminating any constituent part perceived as conflicting with that 
whole’s good, almost guaranteed that this explanation of Leopold would meet with 
stinging criticism.  Already, some thirty years prior, the noted thinker Karl R. Popper had 
forcefully argued that philosophers’ idealisation of Plato clearly needs limits, citing 
specifically the totalitarian and anti-humanitarian nature of Plato’s moral and political 
thoughts.18  Of course, it is these seemingly disquieting aspects of Plato’s moral and 
political ideas that Callicott uses to make initial sense of Leopold’s land ethic.  And like 																																																								
  17 Ibid., p. 245. 
  18 Popper 1963. 
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Popper’s critique of Plato, some of the more biting criticisms against a Callicottian 
interpretation of Leopold aim squarely at Leopold’s supposed willingness to sacrifice so 
much in the name of holism. 
In his 1983 book, The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan charges that the land 
ethic amounts to ‘environmental fascism’.  To demonstrate such fascism, Regan imagines 
a case where a choice must be made either to destroy, say, a rare wildflower or a human 
being.  The clear choice, according to Regan’s understanding of the land ethic, is to do 
away with the member of the more plentiful, less contributory species—namely, the 
human being.  That is, assuming the wildflower’s rarity contributes more to the integrity, 
stability, and beauty of the biotic community than does some human, the land ethic 
clearly endorses sacrificing the human in a case of mortal conflict.19  Given Regan’s own 
arguments that moral rights accrue only to sentient individuals (e.g., humans and other 
higher animals), his use of the term ‘ecofascism’ to denote the implications of Leopold’s 
imputed holism becomes understandable.  Therefore, it is clear that Regan considers the 
land ethic as leading to a reductio ad absurdum and, consequently, rejects it. 
Elliot Sober is similarly critical of morally privileging wholes.  Sober writes: ‘It is 
hard to know what to say to someone who would save a mosquito, just because it is rare, 
rather than a human being, if there were a choice.’  Sober suggests that, to most, the 
assumptions behind the land ethic are so alien, that they preclude its acceptance.20 
 Obviously the fascism charge being levied against Leopold by Regan and Sober is 
correct, if it is the case that Leopold’s land ethic entails an ecological holism 
																																																								
  19 Regan 1983, pp. 361-362. 
  20 Sober 2003, p. 305. 
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exclusionary of other moral concerns.  To be sure, ‘A Triangular Affair’ is Callicott’s 
argument for such exclusivity as the appropriate interpretation of Leopold’s land ethic. 
In contrast, my forthcoming assessment of Leopold entails that land holism is not 
to be invariably privileged over other moral concerns, because Leopold applies a number 
of values both to individuals and to groups, and he touts a consistency maximisation of 
those values in their real-world realisation.  That is to say, Leopold’s writings, 
evidencing, as they do, a respect for values inclusive of utility, virtue, and even moral 
agency, also demonstrate a concern that actions taken on behalf of these values do not 
come at each other’s expense, or if so, that a reconciliation of these values should be 
forthcoming.  Consequently, Regan’s and Sober’s indictment of the land ethic as being 
fascistic is wrongheaded, as is Callicott’s early interpretation of Leopold which supports 
such a skewed hierarchical view. 
To preview my take on Leopold’s moral views, consider an earlier statement by 
Leopold about ‘true conservation’, one that I will later argue is still operative in A Sand 
County Almanac.  In 1939 Leopold writes: ‘When land does well for its owner, and the 
owner does well by his land; when both end up better by reason of their partnership, we 
have conservation.  When one or the other grows poorer, we do not.’21  Yet, the land 
ethic principle found in the later Sand County Almanac (i.e., ‘A thing is right when it 
tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.  It is wrong 
when it tends otherwise.’22)—exists to guide right-minded conservation.  It would be 
surprising if Leopold’s views morphed into a land ethic that would fascistically shove 
aside concerns for, say, human well-being when the well-being of the conservation-																																																								
  21 Aldo Leopold, ‘The Farmer as a Conservationist’, American Forests 45, 6 (June 1939), p. 238; quoted. 
in Meine 1988, p. 388. 
  22 Leopold 1949, p. 224-225. 
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minded farmer is clearly a part of Leopold’s equation for right-minded conservation.  
More on this later. 
For a number of reasons, including perhaps sensitivity to the charge of 
ecofascism, Callicott backed away from his earlier interpretation of Leopold.  The 
clearest reason for this change, however, relates to Callicott’s evolved conviction that the 
conceptual roots of Leopold’s land ethic, upon investigation, are traceable through an 
ethical tradition that includes the likes of naturalist Charles Darwin and philosopher 
David Hume.  As will be seen, situating the land ethic within this tradition supposedly 
has very different consequences from drawing parallels between the land ethic and 
Plato’s moral and political thoughts.23 
Callicott’s Later Interpretation of Leopold 
In Callicott’s later essay, ‘The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic’,24 he 
argues that several pregnant statements by Leopold evidence the Darwinian influence in 
Leopold’s thought.  For example, Leopold claims that extending ethics to previously 
excluded entities and activities is part of ‘ecological evolution’.  Callicott thinks that the 
key thing to be taken away here is that ethics can be discussed in biological terms.  
Furthermore, Leopold states that an ethic is ‘a limitation on freedom of action in the 
struggle for existence.’  This last assertion, argues Callicott, ‘unmistakably calls to mind 
Darwinian evolution as the conceptual context in which a biological account of the origin 
and development of ethics must ultimately be located.’  So, because Leopold seems to 
define ethics and their extension naturalistically, and because he uses language 																																																								
 
  23 Callicott responds to the divisiveness of his views in two important pieces.  Each takes advantage of his 
theoretical switch to a neo-Humean ethical worldview, both in general and with specific reference to 
interpreting Leopold.  See Callicott 1989 and Callicott 1998. 
  24 Callicott 1987. 
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hearkening to evolutionary theory, his moral thinking must be substantially Darwinian.25 
Callicott then prods his readers down a path that leads back to an ethical tradition which, 
while not explicitly endorsed by Leopold, influenced Darwin, and thus should be 
recognised as the land ethic’s theoretical framework. 
Explaining how Darwin sought after an account of ethics complementary to his 
revolutionary biological views, Callicott argues that Darwin embraced the work of the 
‘moral sense theorists’, those who argue that ethics are the product of sentiments or 
feelings.  Indeed, unlike many earlier philosophers who argued that ethics are derivable 
from reason, these moral-sense theorists (e.g., David Hume and Adam Smith) proposed a 
lesser role for reason, namely, as amplifier and informer of sentiments.26 
Taking cues from the moral sense theorists, Darwin surmises that morality 
originates in parental and filial affections, cultivating close-knit social groups amongst 
kin.  These feelings might then attach themselves to extended family, enlarging the social 
group.  But if such enlargement betters its members’ life prospects (e.g., through better 
defense or better provisioning), this might increase the probability of passing down genes 
inclining such pro-social behaviors.  ‘Thus, the more diffuse familial affections, which 
Darwin (echoing Hume and Smith) calls the “social sentiments,” would be spread 
throughout a population.’27 
Callicott goes on to suggest that Leopold’s status as a natural historian made him 
heir to this ‘protosociobiological perspective on ethical phenomena’.  Indeed, Callicott 
tries to further demonstrate the Darwinian nature of Leopold’s thought by stringing 
together two separate quotations from Leopold that hearken to the natural evolution of 																																																								
  25 Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
  26 Ibid., p. 190. 
  27 Ibid., pp. 190-191. 
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ethics: ‘Since “the thing [ethics] has its origin in the tendency of interdependent 
individuals or groups to evolve modes of cooperation,…all ethics so far evolved rest 
upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent 
parts.”’  (For purposes that will become clear, it is important to note that the first half of 
the quotation is part of a larger paragraph not cited by Callicott, one wherein Leopold 
goes on to cite economics as having ethical content, something that Callicott resists for 
reasons also to be explained momentarily.)  These meshed quotations punctuate, Callicott 
maintains, Leopold’s Darwinian-inspired conviction that ethics correlate with 
community.  In fact, if Leopold (following Darwin) is correct about this connection 
between ethics and community, then Callicott thinks it serves as an analytical tool, not 
only for understanding the natural history of morality, but for identifying how morality 
will progress in the future, with all its attending precepts, prescriptions, and proscriptions 
in tow.  Of course, it is based upon this naturalistic interpretation of moral history’s past, 
present, and future from which Callicott thinks Leopold derives his land ethic.28 
Supposedly operative in Leopold’s thinking, then, is Darwin’s idea that as 
humans unite themselves into ever-larger communities, sympathies are extended.  Darwin 
also thinks ‘the simplest reason’ eventually informs persons to expand their social 
instincts toward those complete strangers with whom nationhood unites them, persons 
thereafter only needing to overcome ‘artificial barriers’ to embrace all of humanity.  The 
land ethic, consequently, represents a further inclusion along these lines: the addition of 
the biotic community.  Callicott cites the following quotation from Leopold as proof that 
																																																								
  28 Ibid., pp. 191-192. 
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Leopold thought like this: ‘The land ethic simply enlarges the boundary of the 
community to include soil, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.’29 
As with his early exposition of Leopold in ‘A Triangular Affair’, Callicott again 
highlights Leopold’s judgment that ecology makes thinking of the land as a community 
intelligible (this idea having been developed in the 1920s by English biologist, Charles 
Elton).  But whereas Callicott earlier acknowledges instances wherein Leopold 
alternatively, albeit ‘less consistently’, characterises the land as an organism—in the later 
‘Conceptual Foundations’, he limits Leopold’s considered view to the Eltonian 
ecosystem-as-community analogy, there arguing that the organism model is only 
‘vestigially present’ in Leopold’s land ethic.  Callicott reasons that Leopold probably saw 
the community analogy as more apt, because Leopold recognised the organism view as 
marginal amongst ecologists.  Moreover, Callicott thinks the community view better fits 
the Darwinian/Humean framework in which Leopold supposedly situated his ideas.30 
As a brief but important aside, it is noteworthy that Callicott’s new book again 
changes his (Callicott’s) interpretation of how Leopold treats the organism model in the 
latter’s mature thinking, including within his A Sand County Almanac.  What was 
supposedly ‘vestigial’ in Leopold’s writings is now, by Callicott’s estimation, evidence 
of Leopold having ‘intuitively’ realised how ecosystem ecology would eventually 
develop to embrace multiple metaphors.31  Specifically, Callicott’s new book argues that 
Leopold’s use of mixed-metaphors to characterise ecosystems, including those of 
‘community,’ ‘mechanism,’ and ‘super-organism,’ are all now apt, given how the science 
																																																								
  29 Ibid., p. 193. 
  30 Ibid., pp. 194-202. 
  31 Callicott 2013, p. 89. 
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of ecology has evolved.32  This is super-convenient, too, as Callicott goes on to use the 
‘super-organism’ metaphor to buttress his new, Leopoldian-inspired Earth Ethic.  The 
Earth Ethic is informed by an older essay of Leopold’s, ‘Some Fundamentals of 
Conservation in the Southwest’, which itself very much privileges the organism 
metaphor.33  Consequently, Callicott can now espouse the following: there is continuity 
in Leopold’s own thinking regarding ecosystems (and the metaphors operative therein); 
Leopold’s position is born out by contemporary science given Hierarchy Theory, which 
utilises the aforementioned metaphors;34 and lastly, again by virtue of this switch, 
Callicott can more consistently join the Land Ethic to his new ‘Leopoldian’ Earth Ethic. 
Still, Callicott contends within his ‘Conceptual Foundations’ essay that it is 
actually the inculcation of the land-as-community idea that will ultimately sway persons 
to embrace the land ethic proper (i.e., the land ethic will be accepted because of 
‘ecology’s social representation of nature’, coupled with the notion that we as biotic 
community members are capable of hurting other non-human community members, as 
well as harming the overall biotic community).  Darwinism via Hume and Smith predicts 
the possibility for such an expansion of sentiments, and Leopold—Callicott surmises—
does everything possible in A Sand County Almanac to tout such an expansion of feeling.  
Callicott further suggests that a Copernican understanding of the universe, which, in part, 
situates the earth in a vast, hostile universe, subconsciously facilitates the idea of an 
interdependent, life-giving/sustaining community on Earth.  Callicott allows that Leopold 
never directly acknowledges this consequence of the Copernican view, but Callicott 
																																																								
  32 Ibid., pp. 86-91. 
  33 Ibid., pp. 198-200. 
  34 Ibid., pp. 41-44. 
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nevertheless does assign this perspective a role when identifying the conceptual 
foundations of the land ethic.35 
As said at the outset of discussing Callicott’s revised interpretation of Leopold, 
situating the land ethic within the moral sense tradition has very different consequences 
from drawing parallels between Leopold’s land ethic and Plato’s moral and political 
ideas.  Specifically, the moral sense tradition entails ideas that seemingly require Callicott 
to jettison interpretive elements favorable to the Plato analogy, and consequently, to the 
ecofascism charge hounding his earlier understanding of Leopold.  This is because the 
Darwinian biosocial roots of ethics, Callicott urges, provide some resistance to favoring 
objects of later evolutionary ethical development over earlier ones. 
A hierarchical ordering of moral priorities emerges, with the land ethic being the 
most recent addition and, consequently, wielding the least amount of influence.  A 
supposed upshot of this is that persons, unlike in Plato’s ideal state or Callicott’s 
heretofore ideal biosphere, will not invariably be sacrificed when their actions or interests 
conflict with the good of the whole.36  Callicott explains: 
[. . . ] as a general rule, the duties correlative to the inner social circles to 
which we belong [e.g., family] eclipse those correlative to the rings farther 
from the heartwood when conflicts arise [. . .]  A zealous environmentalist 
who advocated visiting war, famine, or pestilence on human populations [. 
. .] in the name of the integrity, beauty, and stability of the biotic 
community would be [. . .] perverse.  Family obligations in general come 
before nationalistic duties and humanitarian obligations in general come 																																																								
  35 Callicott 1987, pp. 194-195.  
  36 Ibid., pp. 206-207. 
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before environmental duties.  The land ethic, then, is not draconian or 
fascist.37 
 Callicott makes clear, however, that a land ethic, despite its location on the moral 
periphery, can still exert some influence on human behavior.  Just as obligations to one’s 
nation may come at the expense of his inner social circles (e.g., through paying taxes or 
serving in the military), so too nurturing the land’s good may come at the expense of 
other, more typically privileged objects of one’s moral concern.  Callicott contends that 
Leopold’s understanding of ecology, which identified the land’s health as contingent 
upon normal rates of species extinction and the general tendency of evolution to enrich 
the land biologically through speciation, informs our moral sensibilities (and thus a land 
ethic) that the land should at times be considered as more important than the individual 
good of one or more of its parts.38  Hence, the moral good emerging from the land-as-
community idea, a good arising from those characteristically enduring and evolving 
relationships amongst the community’s constituent organisms, gives way to a series of 
behavioral constraints, which Callicott identifies as consistent with Leopold’s thinking.  
As if descending from a mountaintop visit with Leopold, Callicott proclaims: 
According to the land ethic, therefore: Thou shalt not extirpate or render 
species extinct; thou shalt exercise great caution in introducing exotic and 
domestic species into local ecosystems, in extracting energy from the soil 
and releasing it into the biota, and in damming or polluting water courses; 
																																																								
  37 Ibid., p. 208. 
  38 Ibid., pp. 208-210. 
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and thou shalt be especially solicitous of predatory birds and mammals.  
Here in brief are the express moral precepts of the land ethic.39 
After laying-out his revised interpretation of Leopold, Callicott deliberates over 
whether the land ethic is to be understood deontologically (i.e., as duty based, where the 
land ethic assigns moral standing to nature along with correlative duties to humans) or as 
prudential (i.e., the land ethic represents enlightened self-interest for the human 
community).  In favor of a deontological rather than a prudential understanding, Callicott 
not only reiterates that the land ethic’s conceptual foundations point toward duty, but he 
cites additional statements by Leopold, wherein Leopold rejects a prudence-only view of 
the land.  Callicott reminds his readers that Leopold, when indicting as inadequate the 
conservation mindset of his day, explains that this mindset ‘defines no right or wrong, 
assigns no obligation, calls for no sacrifice, implies no change in the current philosophy 
of values.  In respect of land use, it urges only enlightened self-interest.’  Callicott then 
goes on to identify other instances where Leopold uses morally weighty language 
dismissive of prudence-only conservation.40 
There is tension, however, in Leopold’s own account, because of other instances 
where, in Callicott’s words: ‘Leopold does frequently lapse into the language of 
(collective, long-range, human) self-interest.’  Callicott cites, for example, Leopold’s 
historical assessment that ‘the conqueror role is eventually self-defeating’, as it pertains 
to humans relating to the environment.  Thus, surmises Callicott, Leopold appeals to 
something other than a new moral relationship with the land in arguing for revised 
conservation practices.  Referencing another passage, Callicott shows where Leopold 																																																								
  39 Ibid., p. 205. 
  40 Ibid., p. 212. 
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implies that preserving a rich diversity of organisms (where most of this diversity is of no 
economic value to humans) is crucial for maintaining the smaller percentage of life that is 
of economic value.  Again, it appears as if Leopold is, at times, appealing to those 
instincts in humans that elsewhere he argues are woefully inadequate for right-minded 
conservation.  Lastly, Callicott cites Leopold’s explicit recognition that ethics can be 
understood as a way to meet new ecological situations, where the path to ‘social 
expediency’ is unclear to the individual.  Ethics, in Leopold’s words, are ‘a kind of 
community instinct-in-the-making’, which allow for successful navigation of new 
ecological situations.41  Consequently, Callicott’s worry is that Leopold is inconsistent, 
using language indicative of both a concern for prudential conservation and conservation 
based on obligations to nature. 
Callicott reconciles this apparent tension in Leopold by acknowledging differing 
perspectives from which the phenomena of ethics are viewable.  That is, from an outside, 
scientific perspective, ethics are amenable to a sociobiological assessment, where they 
are understandable as contributory to biological fitness.  Taking up this perspective can 
yield the kind of prudential talk in which Leopold sometimes engages.  However, ‘from 
the lived, felt point of view’ of a community member affected by moral sensibilities, 
ethical phenomena are ‘deontological’; ethical experiences alternatively give way to the 
kind of normative talk Leopold wants folks to start using toward the land—talk that is 
replete with notions of ‘genuine love, respect, admiration, obligation, self-sacrifices, 
[and] conscience’.42 
																																																								
  41 Ibid., p. 213. 
  42 Ibid., pp. 213-214. 
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Preparing to move beyond Callicott’s Later Understanding of Leopold 
Regrettably, Callicott’s later take on Leopold continues ignoring a crucial feature 
necessary for an appropriate understanding of the land ethic: the fact that Leopold sees 
the land ethic not as appropriately prioritised either ahead of or, as is mostly the case with 
Callicott’s later understanding, behind other value considerations.  Instead, Leopold sees 
the land ethic as appropriately integrated with other moral concerns, and this has a greater 
seismic shift for our moral thinking than Callicott’s later understanding allows.  Still, 
unlike with his earlier interpretation, Callicott does seem to acknowledge that Leopold’s 
ideas entail a broader moral world-view in some respects. 
Callicott’s attempts at situating the land ethic within a rich Humean/Darwinian 
context allows for acknowledging a number of moral communities, because human moral 
sentiments evince appropriate positive attitudes toward more than one community.  It is 
the process of moral sentiments bestowing significance on various moral communities, of 
course, that allows for Callicott seemingly to escape the ecofascism charge.  A 
combination of natural selection and, supposedly, reason, on his account, synergistically 
yield a non-perverse, hierarchical ordering of moral communities.  These orderings, then, 
will not entail invariably sacrificing humans and non-human animals for a greater biotic 
community.  In fact, Callicott thinks a concern for land-holism rightly occupies the 
periphery of our moral concerns, although, at times, it exerts greater influence on 
humans, when humans possess appropriate ecological information.  Somehow, according 
to Callicott, people will just know (feel?) when relevant ecological information is 
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sufficient to motivate, emotionally, an occasional reversal of priorities not amounting to 
ecofascism. 
I will argue that nowhere does Leopold put forward or imply the kind of 
hierarchical ordering of moral communities Callicott ascribes to him.  Leopold does, 
however, advocate dissolution of value conflict and suggests that appropriate 
conservation involves being respectful of both human and non-human moral goods.  
These moral goods, it is important to stress, are also not simply reducible to the intrinsic 
value of moral communities.  These points are demonstrable from what Leopold penned 
with his own hand. 
Noteworthy, too, is that despite the broadened moral view entailed by the 
Humean/Smithean framework in which Callicott newly situates Leopold, Callicott cannot 
bring himself to acknowledge Leopold advocating prudential reasoning as providing 
normative incentive (though, not the sole incentive) for humans to embrace the land 
ethic.  Recall that within the exposition of Callicott’s later views, there was a description 
of his invocation of a dichotomy of ways Leopold chooses to discuss morality: a 
naturalistic, sociobiological way and a normative way.  Callicott uses this distinction to 
reconcile tensions in Leopold’s discussions of appropriate normative motivators for 
conservation. 
Because Leopold states that a human-centered justification for conservation is not 
sufficient for a moral relationship with the land, and yet he goes on to use human-
centered reasons for pro-land actions, Callicott sees a need to explain away this supposed 
conflict by means of the aforementioned naturalistic/normative distinction.  Callicott 
contends that Leopold’s naturalistic take on ethics endorses an amoral, but nevertheless 
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enlightened, self-interested justification for the land ethic, and the normative take 
underwrites the moral reasons for justifying the land ethic.  Clearly, Callicott fails to 
recognise a broader understanding of Leopold’s ethics that also encompasses morally 
significant, human-centered reasons for embracing a land ethic. 
LEOPOLD’S PLURALISM AND HIS DECISION PROCEDURES 
I endeavor now to show how Leopold’s writings embrace a plurality of values 
when discussing matters of moral import, with some of these values being human-
centered.  This involves a different strategy than Callicott employed and is still 
defending.  That is, rather than relying, as Callicott does, on supposedly pregnant 
statements that indicate Leopold was not only Darwinian in his ethics, but allowing for, 
then, the further supposition that one should draw a direct line from Leopold to moral 
sense theorists like Hume and Smith—I, instead, look to what Leopold actually wrote in 
both A Sand County Almanac and elsewhere.  This provides a more accurate account of 
the man’s ethics.43 
As Callicott himself affirms, Leopold very much stresses a relationship between 
ecology and ethics.  For not only is it the taking-up of the ecological point of view that 
helps determine the reasonableness of his land ethic (something that itself should count 
against Leopold being committed to a strong moral sense account of ethics; Hume’s 
considered view, contextualised by his skepticism, was entirely dismissive of reason’s 
efficacy to define moral goods)—but, as Callicott additionally points out, Leopold thinks 
that the very process of extending ethics to hitherto unregulated forms of conduct is a 
																																																								
  43 Holmes Rolston III is a philosopher very much inspired by Leopold and who goes on to argue for a 
pluralistic approach to environmental ethics, an approach that captures much of what Leopold himself 
values.  See, for example, Rolston 2012.  Rolston argues here that intrinsic moral value can be found in 
humans, individual non-human organisms, species, ecosystems, and the biosphere as a whole. 
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‘process in ecological evolution’ (i.e., Leopold implies that this is a process wherein 
improved social interactions between entities betters their survival conditions).  Leopold 
explains: 
An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle 
for existence.  An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from 
anti-social conduct.  These are two definitions of one thing.  The thing has 
its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve 
modes of co-operation.  The ecologist calls these symbioses.  Politics and 
economics are advanced symbioses in which the original free-for-all 
competition has been replaced, in part, by co-operative mechanisms with 
an ethical content.44 
This is the fuller version of the quotation previously highlighted where I noted 
Callicott’s omitting part of it, specifically, the last sentence wherein Leopold identifies 
economics as a co-operative mechanism having ethical content; this will help later 
identify utility as having an ethical upshot for Leopold.  However, more to the current 
point, further observe here Leopold suggesting that such co-operative mechanisms have 
become more complex as time passes.  Leopold elaborates on this, suggesting that there 
has been moral progress as humans have moved from the simplicity of the Mosaic 
Decalogue to the involvedness of democracy.45  This notion of an emerging complexity 
characterising ethics is an important feature of Leopold’s account, for he touts a 
naturalised explanation as to the origin of our ethical ideas.  Ethics for Leopold, as 
explained above, have emerged from the development of symbioses, or what we might 																																																								
  44 Leopold, 1949, p. 202. 
  45 Ibid., p., 202-203 
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today call ‘mutualisms’.  Norms evolve and persist when following them creates 
reciprocal value. 
Despite the common origin of all ethics, this naturalised explanation as to the 
origin of ethics—when framed against the background of Leopold’s overall thought—
does not allow for a reduction of ethics to a single value scheme (e.g., Callicott’s 
community memberships and the positive emotion-tickling humans ultimately will feel at 
the sight of well-functioning communities).  Indeed, even when Leopold goes on to 
formally state his land ethic principle (which ties the morality of an action to its effects 
on the biotic community), the concern for environmental health underwriting this 
principle fits neither Callicott’s early interpretation of ethical monolith nor his later, still 
privileged interpretation of it as a largely marginal consideration born of expanding 
sentiment.  Rather, established ethics are made more complex by the addition of a new, 
important, holistic moral consideration—the objectively identifiable health of the land, be 
it analogised as organism-like or more akin to community health.46  Present in Leopold’s 
writings, I will now show, is both recognition of this complexity in moral life and an 
emphasis on behavior respectful of a full variety of moral value in the world, the kind of 
variety his intended audience would recognise and to which Leopold himself commits. 
To get at Leopold’s pluralism, consider, for example, Leopold’s contention that 
something very special arises regarding the moral status of us humans when we act in a 
morally correct manner.  The following provocative quotation was written and publicly 
presented, according to Leopold’s biographer, Curt Meine, just some sixteen months 
																																																								
  46 Elsewhere I argue that Leopold’s valuational commitment to ‘health’ can be seen as underwriting 
ascriptions of intrinsic value to both biotic wholes and individual organisms; see Dixon 2016. 
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prior to Leopold organising his ‘Land Ethic’ essay,47 and both are published in A Sand 
County Almanac.  It reads: 
For one species to mourn the death of another is a new thing under the 
sun.  The Cro-Magnon who slew the last mammoth thought only of steaks.  
The sportsman who shot the last [passenger] pigeon thought only of his 
prowess.  The sailor who clubbed the last auk thought of nothing at all.  
But we, who have lost our pigeons, mourn the loss.  Had the funeral been 
ours, the pigeons would hardly have mourned us.  In this fact, rather than 
in Mr. Du Pont’s nylons or Mr. Vannevar Bush’s bombs, lies objective 
evidence of our superiority over the beasts.48 
 Moral agency, correctly exercised, is an ability that lifts humans above the 
constituents of nonhuman nature, or so Leopold thinks here.49  Realising the horror of 
anthropogenic extinction, and internalising it such that we mourn the loss, is an exercise 
of this capacity.  Its use speaks well for us humans, albeit a bit ironically here, it must be 
admitted, given our role in the passenger pigeon’s demise.  Leopold implies that other 
organisms cannot realise either the concept or the magnitude of our world losing another 
species.  We humans can and should (and have, at least some of us).  The reason for this 
advanced status is a capability that comes from being rational enough to be this moral; it 
is not a judgment about an advanced moral status derivable from evolutionary-ordered, 																																																								
  47 Meine explains that Leopold made the remarks that follow, and which would end up in A Sand County 
Almanac under the subsection ‘On a Monument to the Pigeon’, on April 6, 1946 (Meine, p., 482).  Leopold 
began organising the material that became ‘The Land Ethic’ essay in July 1947 (Meine, p., 501).   
  48 Leopold, A Sand County Almanac p., 110 
  49 Even if, as Callicott argues, one should tie Leopold’s ideas substantially to Darwin’s own, there are     
ideas within the latter’s writings regarding ‘conscience’ and the related idea of moral agency that can be 
used to carve-out a unique dignity for humans, one that I argue is contingent upon respect for nonhuman 
constituents of the environment and which is different that what Callicott’s interpretation of Darwin allows; 
see Dixon 2007. 
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community membership simpliciter, as Callicott must maintain.  Indeed, emphasising a 
special moral status for humans based on our ability to be moral, or perhaps better put, 
based on our ability to be moral in a particular way, is more reminiscent of the Kantian 
ethical tradition rather than the Humean/Smithean, moral sense one. 
Careful readers of Leopold also realise that he assigns moral import not only to 
the biotic community via the ‘Land Ethic’, and to human moral agency, as illustrated 
above, but also to the individual character of humans.  Of course, the idea that character 
ought to be seen as morally significant is, as Callicott notes in his earlier interpretation of 
Leopold, an idea dating back, in the Western philosophical tradition, to the Ancient 
period, where philosophers like Plato and Aristotle deliberated on ‘[. . .] the sorts of 
qualities of character it is morally praiseworthy to acquire and maintain.’  Historically, 
these qualities of character are labeled ‘virtues’.50  
With respect to the virtues of humans, Leopold’s biographer, Curt Meine, 
certainly implies that these are of deep concern to Leopold.  Of particular importance to 
him, Meine indicates, is for an individual person to possess a correct disposition toward 
the land.  Remarking on Leopold’s commitment to individualistic thinking generally, 
Meine writes: ‘Although Leopold expressed his devotion to individualism only on rare 
occasions, it was fundamental to his thinking.  He was in many respects an enlightenment 
personality confronting the realities of the twentieth-century world [. . .]’.  As evidence of 
this last idea, Meine cites an essay of Leopold’s in which Leopold bemoans 
conservation’s over-dependency on ‘the current doctrine of private profit and public 
subsidy’.  Leopold writes: 
																																																								
  50 Timmons 2002, pp. 211-212. 
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It [conservation] expects subsidies to do more—and the private owner to 
do less—for the community than they are capable of doing.  We 
rationalise these defects as individualism, but they imply no real respect 
for the landowner as an individual.  They merely condone the ecological 
ignorance which contrasts so strongly with his precocity in mechanical 
things.51 
But why is it important for an individual to be ecologically sophisticated, taking 
responsibility for his treatment of the land?  Why not simply let the brain trust and 
influence of government set ecological standards and enforce them?  After all, if the well-
functioning of varying communities is solely what has intrinsic value, as Callicott 
maintains, it should not matter, morally, how that is achieved.  To be sure, Leopold did 
think private conservation strategically necessary for the maintenance of ecosystemic 
health (i.e., conservation often works better when private persons are predisposed to 
thinking and acting ecologically on their own), but he also thought it was otherwise 
morally important for individuals to have an ethical relationship with the land, where this 
relationship reflects well upon the character of the individual, and where the value of 
having such a character serves as a motivator. 
Meine further expands upon this.  Quoting from an essay of Leopold’s, wherein 
Leopold ‘envisioned a future Wisconsin built along the farmer’s own self-applied 
conservation standards’, Meine cites the following wistful imaginings of Leopold’s 
regarding the appearance of an ideal farm: 
																																																								
  51 Leopold, ‘The Farmer as Conservationist’, p., 316 quoted. in Curt Meine, Aldo Leopold: His Life and 
Work, p. 389. 
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The creek banks are wooded and ungrazed.  In the woods, young straight 
timber-bearing trees predominate, but there is also a sprinkling of hollow-
limbed veterans left for the owls and squirrels, and of down logs left for 
the coons and fur-bearers.  On the edge of the woods are a few wide-
spreading hickories and walnuts for nutting.  Many things are expected of 
this creek and its woods: cordwood, posts, and sawlogs; flood-control, 
fishing, and swimming; nuts and wildflowers; fur and feather.  Should it 
fail to yield an owl-hoot or a mess of quail on demand, or a bunch of 
sweet William or a coon-hunt in season, the matter will be cause for 
injured pride and family scrutiny, like a check marked ‘no funds.’52 
As Meine explains, Leopold thought conservation activities for the farmer ought 
to be, in Leopold’s words, a ‘positive exercise of skill and insight, not merely a negative 
exercise of abstinence or caution’.  Meine further says that Leopold thought the farm to 
be ‘the owner’s portrait of himself.  Conservation [Leopold continues] implies self-
expression in that landscape, rather than blind compliance with economic dogma’.53 
The last three quotations from Leopold carry two implications for present 
consideration: First, they evidence Leopold’s commitment to the idea that persons ought 
to be ethically respected as individuals having certain capacities, not just as entities 
deriving moral value from community membership alone (this idea was also true with the 
above point about moral agency); second, they clarify a virtue that self-aware human 
beings should cultivate as a ground of self-respect, namely, right-minded ecological 
thinking.  That a concern for self-respect is an appropriate motivator—and indeed that it 																																																								
  52 Ibid. 
  53 Ibid. 
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is preferable, in ways, to external motivators—demonstrates Leopold’s commitment to 
the notion that something like virtue is to be valued in itself.  Thus, we see Leopold’s 
commitment to yet another value besides land holism, the life of the self-respecting, 
virtuous individual. 
Further textual evidence against the idea that Leopold’s moral views are 
exclusively concerned with community membership can be found both in the passage just 
prior to Leopold’s articulation of the land ethic principle in A Sand County Almanac and 
in that passage directly following it.  First, regarding that which precedes the land ethic 
principle, Leopold writes: ‘The “key-log” which must be moved to release the 
evolutionary process for an ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as 
solely an economic problem.  Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and 
esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient.’54  Notice this excerpt 
makes clear that Leopold deems it fitting for some human thinking to be economically 
oriented (i.e., for some human thinking to be utility-seeking) and for it to be 
environmentally holistic (i.e., what removing the ‘key-log’ implies).  Interestingly, this 
utility-seeking behavior (i.e., seeking after what Leopold calls the ‘economically 
expedient’) is not simply amoral, as this last quotation from Leopold seems to indicate.  
Consider an earlier statement of Leopold’s about expediency.  He writes: 
An ethic may be regarded as a mode of guidance for meeting ecological 
situations so new or intricate, or involving such deferred reactions, that the 
path of social expediency is not discernible to the average individual.  
Animal instincts are modes of guidance for the individual in meeting such 
																																																								
  54 Leopold1949, p. 224.  Emphasis mine. 
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situations.  Ethics are possibly a kind of a community instinct in-the-
making.55 
Here Leopold says that ethics can serve a precautionary function, increasing the 
probability that individuals acting ethically bring about what is socially advantageous or 
socially expedient.  Conjoin this thought with Leopold’s earlier claim that ethics just are 
a type of symbioses (i.e., ethics are concerned with facilitating mutually beneficial 
relationships) and one starts gaining confidence that Leopold’s ethical views make room 
for expediency or utility sometimes being seen as an appropriate object of ethical 
behavior.  Again, this is a different interpretation than Callicott gives of all this, where he 
argues that human-centered reasons for conservation dwell in an economic realm that is 
thoroughly amoral.  It has always seemed curious that Callicott privileges this amoral 
understanding in his later interpretation if, as he has it, Leopold fits comfortably in a 
moral sentiments scheme that largely prioritises human well-being over other moral 
considerations.  Economics should carry a thoroughly moral upshot for Leopold on his 
account. 
The truth is that Leopold makes an identity claim that logically commits him to 
viewing expediency or utility as ethical.  Moreover, recall the earlier quotation of 
Leopold’s to which special attention was drawn.  Leopold wrote: ‘Politics and economics 
are advanced symbioses in which the original free-for-all competition has been replaced, 
in part, by co-operative mechanisms with an ethical content.’56  Leopold flat-out states 
here that economics help replace free-for-all competition and is an advanced symbioses, a 
co-operative mechanism by virtue of its having ethical content, politics too. 																																																								
  55 Ibid., p. 203. 
  56 Ibid., p. 202. 
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The point Leopold makes after expressing the land ethic principle also concerns 
expediency.  He writes: ‘It of course goes without saying that economic feasibility limits 
the tether of what can or cannot be done for land.  It always has and it always will.’ 57   
Notice that Leopold is saying here that our actions are informed and constrained by the 
perceived human goods that fuel economies.  Shortly after this passage, Leopold 
expresses a rather surprising thought regarding the appropriate scope for such 
expediency.  Leopold reflectively notes: 
For the first time in the history of the human species, two changes are now 
impending.  One is the exhaustion of wilderness in the more habitable 
portions of the globe.  The other is the world-wide hybridization of 
cultures through modern transport and industrialization.  Neither can be 
prevented, and perhaps should not be, but the question arises whether, by 
some slight amelioration of the impending changes, certain values can be 
preserved that would otherwise be lost.58 
After all that Leopold has written up to this point in A Sand County Almanac, it is 
noteworthy to see him not rejecting, wholesale, the morally permissibility for wilderness 
to exist alongside humans reasonably occupying, and thus modifying, the more habitable 
spots on earth.  This revealing admission further instills confidence in the notion that land 
holism ought not to be the only appropriate normative motivator.  Sometimes human 
well-being provides an important constraint.  Callicott’s claim, then, that human self-
interest is strictly non-normative for Leopold cannot survive scrutiny.59 
																																																								
  57 Ibid., p. 225. 
  58 Ibid., p. 188.  Emphasis mine. 
  59 By arguing either for Leopold’s acknowledgment of distinct human goods and, similarly, for those 
goods arising relationally with nonhuman constituents of the environment, I am not hereby arguing for 
		
	 32	
Perhaps, though, Leopold’s pluralism is seen most vividly in his characterisations 
of value conflict and his proposed solutions.  Leopold gave consideration as to how 
conflict amongst his privileged values can reasonably be negotiated.  This is important, of 
course, because circumstances in the world often present dilemmas, forcing one to make 
hard choices, choices that invariably threaten and often require the sacrificing of valued 
things, including morally valued things. 
In ‘The Land Ethic’, recall that Leopold defines conservation to be ‘a state of 
harmony between men and land’.60  Regarding how this conservation-as-harmony comes 
about, consider Curt Meine’s observation that for Leopold, ‘[c]onflict, paradox, and irony 
were part of conservation’s “authentic human drama;” without them, conservation “falls 
to the level of a mere Utopian dream”’.61  It is reasonable to anticipate, then, that the 
values conservation programs attempt to conserve/preserve involve the conflicts, 
paradoxes, and ironies from which Leopold contrasts utopianism.  Moreover, if my 
exposition of Leopold’s moral views is correct, then Leopold sees a variety of moral 
value within both humans and the land.  Thus, it is the successful negotiation of conflicts, 
paradoxes, and ironies brought about, at times, by competing moral values that engenders 
some of the harmony wrought by conservation.  Indeed, this idea is present in Leopold’s 
explanation of when it is that conservation efforts may be deemed a success.  Recall 
Leopold’s definition of conservation first given in this essay: ‘When land does well for its 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Leopold to be seen as something akin to an ‘enlightened anthropocentrist’, as Mark Bryant Budolfson does 
in a fairly recent article (Budolfson 2014).  For my take on what would have to be Leopold’s views on the 
intrinsic value of non-human nature, see Dixon 2016. 
  60 Ibid., p. 207. 
  61 Meine 1988, p. 371. 
		
	 33	
owner, and the owner does well by his land; when both end up better by reason of their 
partnership, we have conservation.  When one or the other grows poorer, we do not.’62 
Leopoldian conservation along these lines and the negotiation of the kinds of 
value conflict it invariably involves are illustrated when Leopold writes of practical 
solutions to environmental problems.  For example, in touting a particular solution to the 
problem of shrinking plant species brought about by human encroachment, Leopold 
argues that ultimately we can have both ‘progress and plants’.  He writes in A Sand 
County Almanac: 
The shrinkage in the flora is due to a combination of clean-farming, 
woodlot grazing, and good roads.  Each of these necessary changes of 
course requires a larger reduction in the acreage available for wild plants, 
but none of them requires, or benefits by, the erasure of species from 
whole farms, townships, or counties.  There are idle spots on every farm, 
and every highway is bordered by an idle strip as long as it is; keep cow, 
plow, and mower out of these idle spots, and the full native flora, plus 
dozens of interesting stowaways from foreign parts, could be part of the 
normal environment of every citizen.63 
Here, then, is an example of conflict negotiation where Leopold clearly sees a 
way to respect multiple things of moral value.  Leopold indicates that farming, grazing, 
road construction, and the concomitant reduction of land available for wild plants are a 
necessary means to some human goods (e.g., the moral goods represented by increases in 
utility for the farmer).  He does not think that realising these goods must lead to 																																																								
  62 Leopold, ‘The Farmer as Conservationist’, p., 238 quoted. in Curt Meine 1988, p. 388. 
  63 Leopold 1949, pp. 47-48. 
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eliminating the plant species from changing landscapes.  Border spaces, which farmers 
already value for reducing erosion from their fields, become spaces specifically reserved 
for plant species deliberately removed from fields, for example.  Leopold’s general point 
is that human goods brought about by some industry need not conflict invariably with the 
goods represented by the flourishing of nature. 
Although Leopold’s suggestions as to where plants can find suitable habitat were 
ecologically creative, his method of conflict resolution in the above example is, from a 
philosophical point-of-view, rather ordinary.  Leopold’s strategy acknowledges the goods 
brought about by humans modifying the land while searching for a way to eliminate any 
resulting harm to certain values instantiated by the land: he suggests building roads such 
that they do not come at the expense of species of flora and the ecosystems to which they 
contribute.  A more formal way of stating this conflict-resolution strategy is:  
If there is some method X of realising value Φ such that X causes a 
reduction in another value Ψ, one ought to search for an alternative 
method Y that realises Φ without also causing a reduction in any other Ψ. 
Let us call this strategy of Leopold’s the Basic Dissolving Strategy.  Indeed, it is 
the kind of conflict dissolving strategy that underlies solutions like that of placing exotic 
and native plant species along roadsides and within medians or letting those plants subsist 
on unused portions of a homestead.  Of course, for Leopold, conservation is often more 
hard fought and incremental than to allow for the Basic Dissolving Strategy.  For 
example, conservation efforts may sometimes be spurred not by conscientious private 
citizens but by robust governmental action, and this can have some negative effects.  
Leopold writes: 
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There is a clear tendency in American conservation to relegate to 
government all necessary jobs that private landowners fail to perform.  
Government ownership, operation, subsidy, or regulation is now widely 
prevalent in forestry, range management, soil and watershed management, 
park and wilderness conservation, fisheries management, and migratory 
bird management, with more to come.  Most of this growth in 
governmental conservation is proper and logical, some of it is inevitable.  
That I imply no disapproval of it is implicit in the fact that I have spent 
most of my life working for it.64 
But Leopold could not ultimately be satisfied with government doing ever-
increasing amounts of conservation work.  What comes after the quotation in the text is 
Leopold questioning, rather ominously, whether greater amounts of governmental 
participation in conservation may cause this system to collapse under its own weight.  
Specifically, he questions a government-heavy conservation, asking: ‘What is the 
ultimate magnitude of the enterprise?  Will the tax base carry its eventual ramifications?  
At what point will governmental conservation, like the mastodon, become handicapped 
by its own dimensions?’65  The point here is that although Leopold might think it ‘proper 
and logical’ for government to take-up many conservation roles not being assumed by 
any other entity, he cannot think that the government should take-up all conservation 
roles.  Leopold worries that government resources might be decimated by too heavy a 
workload. 
																																																								
  64 Leopold, 1949, p. 213. 
  65 Ibid. 
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Leopold also cannot think that many governmental conservation roles should 
ideally remain the government’s in perpetuity for normative reasons; this would be 
inconsistent with both his stated goals and values.  Thus, even if implementing 
conservation measures via governmental regulation makes the world a better place, as it 
surely has, the world would be an even better place, ethically, if persons voluntarily took 
up the mantle of conservation themselves. 
Leopold’s judgments of FDR’s New Deal conservation illustrate the above 
claims.  Curt Meine, explains that Leopold regarded alphabet-program conservation as ‘a 
“natural consequence” of the nation’s past abuse of resources, and its mixed success in 
correcting that abuse’.  But Leopold knew all too well that what was needed in terms of 
true conservation surpassed the government’s simply accumulating larger swaths of land 
(such accumulation being a New Deal mainstay).  Leopold recognised, as Meine puts it, 
that ‘resources were everywhere, and so was abuse’.  Hence, conservation, for Leopold, 
needed to be everywhere, and this meant its emerging as a way of life on both public and 
private lands.66  Leopold explains the dynamic: 
It is easy to side-step the issue of getting lumbermen to practice forestry, 
or the farmer to crop game or conserve soil, and to pass these functions to 
government.  But it won’t work.  I assert this, not as a political opinion, but 
as a geographical fact.  It’s not in the cards.  The basic problem is to 
induce the private landowner to conserve on his own land, and no 
conceivable millions or billions for public land purchase can alter that 
fact.67 																																																								
  66 Meine 1988, p. 320.  
  67 Aldo Leopold, Undated Fragment, Leopold Papers 10-6, 16 quoted. in Meine 1988, pp. 320-321. 
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Meine then adds that there is more than pragmatism doing work in Leopold’s 
thinking here: 
This emphasis on individual responsibility was now a firm cornerstone in 
[Leopold’s] philosophical construction.  It grew out of his lifetime of 
conservation field work, but now he was beginning to see it in its larger 
social context.  Private conservation was simply an expression of ‘that first 
theorem of social justice: The Lord helps those who help themselves.’ 
Moreover, to hand the job over to government was to lose many of the 
rewards and challenges—‘the social disciplines’—formerly reserved for 
the individual.68 
As was shown earlier and as is demonstrated here (especially in the last sentence 
above), Leopold commits himself to the idea that persons ought to be respected as 
individuals and, what is more, that these persons ought to realise that a source of self-
respect comes from their engaging in right-minded ecological thinking and activity.  Put 
back into the context of New Deal conservation, Meine’s point about Leopold appears to 
be this: Leopold thought New Deal conservation measures are better than an absence of 
conservation measures altogether, but it is an even greater moral improvement if 
individuals take action on their own to make conservation more widespread and effective.   
For Leopold, then, the adoption of conservation measures by an individual person 
is character-enhancing in ways that governmental action is not.  Yet Leopold concedes 
that the extent and severity of ecological degradation requires governmental intervention 
to coerce a coordination sufficiently broad to effect large-scale, systemic restorations.  
Again, though, even though government has a proper role in broad-scale conservation 																																																								
  68 Meine 1988, p. 321. 
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projects, especially in correcting past abuses that private citizens are unable/unwilling to 
remedy, there are responsibilities landowners ought not to shirk.  An evolving 
partnership, therefore, between individuals and government, where individuals become 
increasingly land-friendly represents—for Leopold—moral improvement, especially as 
this partnership enhances the future prospects for persons to engage in right-minded 
conservation for themselves.  Leopold’s thinking regarding both New Deal conservation 
and governmental conservation generally, therefore, represents an additional strategy for 
dissolving value conflict.  This strategy can be given the following formulation: 
If there is some method X of realising value Φ such that X causes a 
reduction in another value Ψ, and there is no other alternative method Y 
that realises Φ without also causing a reduction in any other Ψ, then X 
should be pursued in such a way as to better the possibilities for future, 
less conflict causing realisations of both Φ and Ψ. 
Let us call this conflict negotiating strategy of Leopold’s the Long Term 
Dissolving Strategy.  A consistent theme in Leopold’s conservation thinking, then, is the 
rightness of humans dissolving value conflict, whether through creative solutions that 
dissolve the conflict with no sacrifice of value (i.e., through the Basic Dissolving 
Strategy) or through a more protracted strategy that betters the position for future value 
realisations, which reduce the conflict amongst those values hitherto at odds (i.e., through 
the Long Term Dissolving Strategy).  Again, Leopold’s example of using roadsides and 
medians for wild growth areas is an instance of the Basic Dissolving Strategy; his views 
on New Deal conservation, an example of the Long Term Dissolving Strategy.  These are 
the only decision procedures Leopold’s ideas clearly entail other than the land ethic 
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principle itself.  So, if one wants to derive a complete environmental ethic from Leopold, 
these need to be present.  Moreover, one must invoke multiple notions of the right and the 
good to make sense of Leopold’s commitments, notions of the right and the good that do 
not appear reducible to one another to yield a monistic theory.  Unfortunately for 
Callicott, he is dismissive of pluralism, generally,69 despite its fairly obvious presence in 
Leopold’s writings. 
CONCLUSION 
Leopold’s land ethic principle goes as follows: ‘A thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.  It is wrong when it 
tends otherwise.’70  Surely if one reads this moral principle in isolation from the rest of 
Leopold’s ideas, including in isolation from what one finds outside the ‘Land Ethic’ 
essay, then she might conclude that Leopold is offering up a moral principle inspired by a 
monistic theory of value, one that when made explicit is sufficient for guiding all relevant 
moral conduct.  But thinking this is a mistake.  Leopold’s land ethic principle instead 
represents an additional (revolutionary!) moral consideration. 
This essay has put forward the beginnings of a rather radical interpretation of 
Leopold’s moral ideas, a morally pluralistic one.  A pluralistic take on Leopold’s views 
calls into question the most famous interpretations of Leopold put forward by philosopher 
J. Baird Callicott.  Whereas I argue that Leopold both embraces moral pluralism and 
emphasises a consistency maximisation of values, Callicott first characterised Leopold as 
																																																								
  69 See Callicott 2003.  A foil for Callicott’s critique of pluralism, and an important work in its own right, 
is Christopher Stone’s pluralistic approach put forward in Stone 1988; however, one can also find a shorter 
essay of Stone’s defending pluralism in the same volume as Callicott’s 2003 essay: See Stone 2003.  A 
pragmatic approach by Andrew Light that criticises Callicott’s indictment of pluralism can also be found in 
this same volume of collected essays; see Light 2003. 
  70 Leopold 1949, pp. 224-225.  
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exclusively privileging biotic wholes, and then later he backs away from this, arguing 
that Leopold is best understood within a Humean framework, one that prioritises varying 
moral communities.  However, this last move is based on a monistic theory of value that 
is not explicitly found in Leopold, and it relegates environmental entities to, by any 
reasonable estimation, a negligibly efficacious periphery of moral concern.  It largely 
banishes the land ethic from being front-and-center in persons’ moral thinking to the 
margins of persons’ moral sentiments and their fluctuations.  Given Leopold’s stated 
values and goals, Callicott’s move is decidedly un-Leopoldian and cannot be the ‘Land 
Ethic’s’ moral theoretics.  Leopold’s explicit views are far more integrative, as they 
weave in a land ethic with familiar moral concepts.  This should not be surprising, as 
Leopold hoped a land ethic would come to have intellectual currency for quite a varied 
group: philosophers, the religious, conservationists, and other readers.  All of these 
groups have now heard of a land ethic thanks to Leopold’s genius and to the stalwart 
advocacy of scholars, especially J. Baird Callicott.  The hope is that the ideas argued for 
in this essay go some way toward an even better understanding of what Leopold truly 
wanted to say, and thus what elements need be present in a theory that emerges from, or 
is otherwise complementary to, his land ethic.71 
																																																								
71 For providing helpful comments, the author thanks Simon Hailwood, Donald Scherer, Jacqueline L. 
Cowan, and several anonymous referees.  Thanks also to conference attendees at the Annual Meeting of the 
International Society for Environmental Ethics, Allenspark, CO, February 18-21, 2014.  Their feedback on 
material presented there, much of which made its way into this paper, was also of great help. 
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